NOTE: This is the second part of a two-part article: Part 1 is at https://www.greensocialthought.org/thinking-politically/challenging-marxism-as-well-as-identity-politics-polyconflictualism-and-a-processural-based-paradigm-that-explains-social-change-from-below/ , and should be read first. This part advances what is called a Polyconflictual Model of Society as an initial contribution to constructing a Processural Paradigm for the understanding of society. This part focuses on how we create social change from below.
A “PROCESSURAL” PARADIGM[i]
To surpass the understanding of the structural paradigm, the differences must be delineated. A processural paradigm is hereby advanced. However, it is first necessary to disaggregate the social response from the social structure.
The structural paradigm models both integrate the social structure and the social response; in other words, they describe the existing structure and the response to it as though they were/are unified.
This processural paradigm rejects that approach; it separates the social response from the social order. In other words, the social structure that exists in any social order is one that has developed over time via historical processes since the respective social order was established. However, the social response is how people respond at any particular time to the established social order: they may accept it, they may seek to modify it, or they may reject it. In any case, the processes that led to the established social order are different than how people respond to the current version of the social order, and they must be kept separate; otherwise, one could not understand how anyone could seek to modify a social order beyond the limits set by those in power in any social order, and certainly could not explain why some reject the entire social order.[ii]
However, a processural paradigm encompasses societal models that focus on the processes by which a social situation develops within a particular social order, recognizing that people can accept, reject, or seek to modify the status quo or components thereof.[iii] However, we must first consider what is meant by social situation.
A “situation” in this conceptualization is abstract: there is no one definition of situation. Therefore, in any case, the researcher must herself or himself define the parameters of what is being considered; the researcher must define the situation under consideration. If one is considering race relations in Chicago, for example, then this limits the area of analysis to that city; on the other hand, if one is considering race relations in the State of Illinois, then that is looking across the entire territorial state. While this risks subsequent researchers questioning whether the defined “situation” is appropriate for studying the respective subject, it is felt that this is much less of a potential problem than trying to shoehorn all subsequent research into the same situational box regardless of particular circumstances.
However, a situation can be multi-faceted; there can be many factors to consider within each defined situation. In addition to geographic location, it could be affected by time, by particular people involved, perceived understandings of power relations, etc., etc.[iv] And the interplay between these factors would be dynamic, not static.
In other words, a processural paradigm rejects the idea that there is just one key established relationship between social categories within a social order on which it is ordered; that this key relationship determines the further developments of the social order; and that this relationship is rigid, holding in all times and in all places. In fact, a processural paradigm rejects the idea that the social order is based on any socially constructed categories and argues that an understanding of social relations must be based initially on the dynamics of individual relationships, although they can be combined into larger and larger groups for efforts seeking social change.
A processural paradigm sees the possibilities of a multiplicity of relationships across a social order and recognizes that these relationships vary situation-by-situation. To put it another way, there is more than one possible way to understand any social situation, but the relationships between possible alternatives are flexible, not rigid. This means that these relationships are interconnected and interpenetrated, and can be transient, emerging, and/or deteriorating, all at the same time; i.e., they are in flux.[v]
In other words, the argument is that sociologists must recognize that there are not rigid relationships between two particular social categories that extend completely across the social order—say a production-based analysis based on workers/bosses, or a gender-based analysis based on males/females—that determine further social development of the social order: that possibility is rejected (see, among others, Fiske, 1993; Nederveen Pieterse, 2004, 2008, 2015). In fact, because of flexible social relationships, it is argued that we can only understand developments within a situation-by-situation basis. To put it again in another way, a processural paradigm counterposes a situational approach to the categorical approach of a structural paradigm.
To put it still in another way, a processural paradigm rejects the idea that location in a social structure determines one’s future behavior, thinking and activities.
Accordingly, because of the situational approach, sociologists can no longer represent a social order as being based on a series of externally-imposed social categories—such as those based on race, gender, or class.[vi] We must recognize that any social order is based on pre-established relations, but that social situations located within any particular social order are between socially-connected individuals, not externally-imposed categories. (Individuals may choose to create or join groups based on whatever criteria the individual accepts, but that is not relevant here; this is discussed further below.)
Now that a processural paradigm has been advanced, it is time to focus specifically on a new model of society: Polyconflictualism.
POLYCONFLICTUALISM
The work on Polyconflictualism has been directly inspired by John Fiske’s 1993 book, Power Works, Power Plays. Fiske was writing to overcome what he considered the theoretical hopelessness bequeathed to us by Foucault’s (1979) analysis of disciplinary practices.
Fiske explicitly rejects a structural model of the social order—“Contemporary capitalist societies are too highly elaborated to be understood by a structural model”—and argues:
… class can no longer occupy a position of theoretical centrality but must take its place alongside other axes gathered around which social identities and social systems are organized. It is still important, but has been joined by race/ethnicity and gender as perhaps the core axes of social difference. But this core is not certain, for other axes, such as age, marital status, religion, region, locality are all important and, in any instance, any of them may join the core, or dislodge one of the core axes from its centrality (Fiske, 1993: 8).
The terms he utilizes are “power-bloc” and “the people,” but these are not solidified groups, rather representing fluid alliances that one might characterize as the “haves” and “have-nots.” He elaborates:
It is a post-structural opposition because the categories are not stable nor structurally set, but mobile, strategically, and tactically formed and dissolved according to the perceived exigencies of the issue involved and its situating conditions. “The power-bloc” and “the people” are not social categories, but alliances of social interests formed strategically or tactically to advance the interests of those who formed them.
But whatever form it takes, the struggle between the power-bloc and the people always involves power (Fiske, 1993: 10).
Polyconflictualism is based philosophically on the work of Alfred Schutz, a phenomenologist (see Ferguson, 2006), who recognizes the physical world but argues that people interpret their social reality, meaning that people can experience the exact same physical reality but understand it differentially (Schutz, 1967).[vii] Many social factors affect their interpretation, including personal attributes such as an individual’s “gender,” “race,” family situation, culture (specifically including whether they were raised according to a set of religious teachings—and which one—or not), place one was raised, time period, previous experiences, etc. Their interpretations are also affected, consciously or not, by how they “view” the established social order; i.e., which “model of society” they use.
When they then value their interpretations, based on their own moral/philosophical/religious/ political-based values, they then come to an individual understanding of the social situation. Accordingly, understandings of any situation differ and, thus, while they do not have to, nonetheless, behaviors can diverge accordingly.
It is only through on-going discussion with others (including representations presented by the mass media), and self- contemplation, that we come to a socially constructed understanding of a respective social order. “Schutz argues that modern society is characterized by the multiplicity and variety of social realities that have become available to us” (Ferguson, 2006: 94). Creating agreed-upon understandings of social “reality,” therefore, is a collective experience; it is how we construct social meaning.
Thus, while accepting historical materialism of Marx and Engels (1848/1978) as establishing a socio-historical context, Schutz’ work is not limited to nor constrained by the context.
One of Fiske’s key points is that all current social orders today (the status quo) are based on the values of hierarchy and domination and, accordingly, are oppressive; however, he argues that it is at least theoretically possible for there to be a non-oppressive social order or at least a qualitatively less oppressive social order, based on the values of equality and solidarity. He argues there has been an oppressor/oppressed relationship in most if not all societies in the past, and that there is an oppressor/oppressed relationship in each currently established social order. However, while the oppressor generally gets “its” way, it almost never gets this without resistance from “below”—active or passive—or even, at times, without efforts to create a positive alternative to the oppression; i.e., the birthing of a new social arrangement.
Fiske argues that to theoretically understand this effort from below, we must recognize there is not just one type of power as sociology, following Weber, has long proclaimed: Fiske argues that there are two types of power—one from the top-downward, or dominative power (i.e., captured in Weber’s conceptualization), and one from the bottom-up, or emancipatory power, based on social power created and generated by collective aggregations of people at the bottom of any social order and who refuse to accept the restrictions/limitations of the established social order.[viii] Dominative power is therefore seen as oppressive and used to maintain or extend social order oppression. Emancipatory power, as a counter, both challenges oppression and works to pre-figure non-oppressive social relationships.
Accordingly, an established social order is recognized as having a multiplicity of social situations that are each loaded with conflict, whether potential or actual. (This is why the present author has advanced the term, “Polyconflictualism.”)
Two aspects of Polyconflictualism
There are two aspects to Polyconflictualism. The first is the necessity to understand how individuals are affected by the social order: it is argued that it not sufficient to remain at the level of socially constructed categories; that analysts need to “descend” to the individual level. Yet, focusing on individuals is not sufficient, especially to fight social oppression. Many of us have heard the old expression, “You can’t fight City Hall,” suggesting it is futile to challenge authority. However, it is suggested that to change the saying by adding one word, to “You can’t fight City Hall alone,” opens new ways of thinking.
So, the second aspect of Polyconflictualism requires us to understand how individuals come together to form groups and larger conglomerations of people, which can serve as the basis to fight oppression. Engaging in both processes—devolving from socially constructed categories to individuals, and then aggregating from individuals to groups—is important to understand human behavior in any situation, especially in regard to social change. It is to the first aspect we now turn.
Seeing Individuals Affected by the Social Order
As mentioned above, it is only when people enter adolescence that they generally begin questioning the values and decisions made by their parents.[ix] Their social networks expand as they move outwards from their family toward larger social circles that develop as one reaches higher grades in school, especially through gaining access to transportation, and along with what they are learning in school, church and/or from friends, they begin questioning more and more. That they are questioning does not mean that they are rejecting things learned previously, but they are thinking about things in oftentimes new ways. The long and short of it is that when they ask new questions, they then decide whether to accept, modify, or reject previous answers.
As they are exposed to more and more “things,” ideas and relationships, many become aware of mistreatment of some folks but not others; sometimes this understanding develops within “their” social order, and sometimes it develops when they become aware of others like themselves who are mistreated simply because they live in a different social order. Whether they use the term or not, many become aware of various social oppressions. This is the first step toward becoming socially and/or politically conscious: they begin to understand that not all people are equal, that some have more power than others, and that powerful people have a strong tendency to mistreat those with less power.
And oftentimes, people who become aware of the mistreatment of others, seek ways to end this mistreatment. Sometimes this is through individualistic “solutions” such as inviting others to come to their church and to “find Jesus” or whatever religious leader they follow. It may involve seeking to get people involved in “solving” an unfortunate social problem, such as homelessness and/or hunger. Now and then, however, they might see this mistreatment as being systemic, such as mistreatment of entire groups of people because of the color of their skin, their sex and/or sexuality, their lack of suitable and remunerative employment, etc., and they may even deem this mistreatment “oppressive” and require larger changes in the social order.
They may even attempt to join with those mistreated to end such. And they may be welcomed or rejected by those they deem “mistreated”; not all who are deemed “mistreated” see their situation as such, or they might not believe they need help, deserve help, or whatever.
However, it is when the situation is seen as systemic, where people try to join together to address these social inequities, and where the status quo resists making necessary changes, that the issue of conflict can develop from potential to actual.
Nonetheless, actual conflict only emerges when people in the situation interpret their situation as oppressive: a situation cannot be seen as oppressive, and thus more than potentially conflictual, without those affected seeing it as such. Outside analysts can identify potential conflict by identifying antagonistic interests in any particular situation. Yet, potential conflict cannot become realized as actual from the outside. This means that just because “outsiders” see conflict as such, “objectively,” it cannot be so classified as actual conflict on that alone; the situational definition of oppression, and therefore of actual conflict, must be made by those conscious of it from the inside of the situation, or by those located outside but operating in active solidarity with people on the inside of a particular situation.
Each person who is in an oppressive situation must interpret it as such on their own, and this means this must be done on an individual-by-individual basis and cannot be assumed to be the product of a group coming as a whole to a particular understanding. Yet it does not matter whether a situation has actually changed—presumably for the worse—or if simply an individual’s interpretation of a stable situation changes: the point is that it becomes defined as being “oppressive” by an individual (Piven and Cloward, 1979).
Accordingly, however, this situational definition of oppression can only be made initially by individuals, and not collectively by members of socially based categories, although a collective definition of oppression can be constructed through social processes (see below) once individuals have come to define their particular situation as such (see Melucci, 1989, 1995). The important point here, however, is that the initial starting point of understanding social reality and then interpreting it can only be done by individuals, and not with collective categories.[x]
Once a person defines a situation as “oppressive,” there are four basic possible responses: (1) accept it (especially as it is felt to be impossible to change, or that the risks are too great to even try, an understanding that is what oppressors seek to establish); (2) seek options that at least seem to reduce or mitigate the oppression for an individual and/or her/his immediate family; (3) respond to the oppression by trying to project it onto other people/groups that are even in a less advantageous position than oneself; or (4) challenge the oppression. While options one, two and four are fairly obvious, an example of the third approach is where poor whites transform their personal feelings of oppression and project them as systematic oppression onto African Americans, as has historically been done by the Ku Klux Klan.[xi]
To put these options in a theoretical framework, it is argued that once a situation is defined from the inside as being oppressive, then people have to choose whether to support the top-down, dominative power that maintains or extends the oppression, or they have to support the bottom-up, emancipatory power that challenges the oppression. So, in the list of possible responses to oppression, 1, 2 and 3 would be seen as supporting dominative power, while 4 would be seen as supporting emancipatory power.
The important thing to recognize, however, is the process by which these positions are taken: they are the result of individuals choosing which side they are on in any particular situation and not to choose is, ultimately, a choice to accept the existence of dominative power. In other words, a white woman does not take an anti-racist position because she is white or female, but because she has chosen to challenge this particular oppression. Again, it is argued that individuals choose which side they are on, and that these choices are individually chosen, not a product of a particular social positioning by analysts, no matter how brilliantly done.
Recognizing that people choose which side they are on has a number of important ramifications. First, it demolishes any privileged position of any group; e.g., it destroys the idea that workers are going to transform the current social order simply because they are workers; that women are going to save us simply because they are female, etc. Second, it destroys any privileged oppression: racial oppression is not worse than gender oppression or class oppression; it sees any oppression as being bad, although it recognizes that there may be strategic and/or tactical reasons to prioritize challenging one set of oppressions in any particular situation. And third, it brings individual responsibility into sociology, which means that individuals are responsible for their social behavior.
Basically, this first of two steps reorients sociology away from imposed categories to “individuals.” Yet, Polyconflictualism goes even further.
Polyconflictualism recognizes that human beings are not generally consistent internally: we can be progressive (challenging oppression, while acting to develop emancipatory power) in some situations, while being reactionary (acting to extend oppression and supporting dominative power) in others.
What does this mean? A very simple example might illuminate this. Say there are two male workers, one black and one white. Say they work in a factory, and the foreman is on them hard, trying to get them to work faster than they feel is safe. The two workers bond together and refuse to speed-up. This is an example of both workers acting to develop emancipatory power, resisting the dominative power of the boss.
Yet, later, they leave the factory. The white worker returns home, and then goes to a neighborhood meeting called to figure out how to keep African Americans from moving into the area. The black worker goes home as well. His child support payment is due to his ex-wife. He mutters, “Screw her,” and refuses to mail the check.
In the two examples subsequent to these workers acting to develop emancipatory power, both the white male worker and the black male worker act to maintain dominative power: they are extending or maintaining oppressive situations. Yet only a short time previously, they had been acting to develop emancipatory power.
What this illuminates is that people can be internally inconsistent; just like the fact that members of any group are not all good or all bad—some of the finest people I have met in the world have been white, as have been some of the biggest jerks; some of the finest people I have met have been lesbians, as have been some of the biggest jerks, and I can say this for members of every group—members of any group are not all good or all bad. And Polyconflictualism recognizes this theoretically, not assuming they will act in one way or another in any situation, yet recognizing they can act consistently across situations or can act contradictorily in different situations, or even differently in the same situation at other times. In other words, with Polyconflictualism, we recognize that we cannot predict beforehand how anyone will act in any particular situation; only by observing the processes by which people make decisions over time can we understand the process by which social change does or does not develop. By understanding that individuals make specific choices to act/not act in any situation, and that they can act contradictorily in different situations, focus has shifted from the category level “down” to the individual. This process—moving from category to individual—is the first aspect of Polyconflictualism.
Coalescence into Groups
This leads us to the second aspect of Polyconflictualism: the need to understand how individuals coalesce into groups so as to create social power from below, what I call “emancipatory” power. This begins with a focus on culture, and then the focus shifts to processes that lead to collective identity and action.
Fiske sees mobilization of cultural resources as being key to resistance. He sees culture as being multifaceted.:
I understand culture … to encompass the struggle to control and contribute to the social circulation and uses of meanings, knowledges, pleasures, and values. Culture always has sense-making and power-bearing functions. Its sense-making function contains concerns such as those of knowledge, discourse, representation, and practice; within its power-bearing functions are those of power, control, discipline, struggle, resistance, and evasion (Fiske, 1993: 13).
It is this sense that culture has both sense-making and power-bearing functions that is of interest to this author.
Fiske discusses this in considerable detail. He explains the use of knowledges (plural) instead of knowledge (singular), pointing out that discourse activates knowledge, and that discourse represents the world through each knowledge; hence, discourse exerts power over the world. He notes, “There is a physical reality outside of discourse, but discourse is the only means we have of gaining access to it.” Further, though, discourse is a site of social contestation: “discourse also represents the social relations and power relations involved in knowing the world in [a particular] way” (Fiske, 1993: 15).
And while Fiske is ultimately interested in showing how individuals resist “imperializing” power—in my terminology, dominative power—nonetheless, he places most of his emphasis on how culture has imperializing power-bearing functions:
Knowledge, discourse, and representation are agencies of power and control. Because the knowledge of reality involves the social relations involved in knowing it that way, the power to control ways of knowing is a power over what is accepted as reality, and over those among whom that acceptance circulates (Fiske, 1993: 16).
Yet, despite this emphasis, Fiske gives a clue that is very provocative, especially in light of this author looking at the processes of developing group solidarity through developing collective identity. “The importance of never forgetting that events and objects exist outside of discourse, despite the inaccessibility of that existence on its own terms, is that they can always be placed into discourse differently” (Fiske, 1993: 15). In other words, different groups and individuals do not have to accept the dominant, imperializing (dominative) power version of reality; they can interpret events and objects outside of imperializing discourse, developing knowledges of their own, and put them into a localizing (emancipatory) discourse that disagrees with and ultimately challenges the imperializing one.[xii]
The limitation of Fiske’s work seen here is that he only theoretically conceives resistance on an individual level; he never considers how a group of people come together, much less decide how to resist jointly, or to join to challenge the oppression through building a social movement, such as was done respectively by the Civil Rights/Black Power, anti-Vietnam War, and Women’s movements. Expanding our thinking to specifically include group solidarity is important, since resistance and challenges can only be sustained over time by groups of people, and this is especially true in the face of direct repression.
Hence, this is the second of a two-part process: combining individuals into self-chosen groups. How does this happen? A detour must be made here to enable a discussion of the literature on collective identities. First, however, it must be recognized that individuals have multiple identities, and each is equally valid—the salience of any particular identity is not pre-ordained nor made a “master-status” that directs all other choices but is the result of choices that an individual makes in any particular situation. An example from a study of female factory workers in Nigeria and India well illustrates this:
Identities are selectively mobilized in response to economic, social, political, and cultural processes. For example, capital attempts to mobilise the ‘feminine’ qualities of women workers in world market factories to ensure a docile, dexterous, and cheap labour force. Identities are therefore constantly shifting, not only historically, but also at a given point in time. Faced with North Indian racism, a woman from Kerala asserts her identity as a Malayalee; in the next moment, faced with male chauvinism, she asserts her identity as a woman; and in the next hour, confronted with managerial discipline, she asserts her identity as a working class woman. She possesses all these identities and yet she is not reducible to any one of them (Chhachhi and Pittin, 1991: 25).
And although Chhachhi and Pittin only discuss individual identities, other researchers point out there are also collective and public identities (Johnston, Laraña and Gusfield, 1994: 12).
But how are these identities mobilized, and their resources utilized? James Scott, in his study of “everyday resistance” by Malaysian peasants, focuses on “the symbols, the norms, the ideological forms [created] that constitute the indispensable background to their behavior” (Scott, 1985: 38). In other words, it is the “normative subculture” that exists prior to the situation that helps give meaning and understanding to the new situation (Scott, 1985: 297).[xiii] Fantasia’s (1988) study of a workers’ wildcat strike in the United States also shows the existence of a similar normative subculture on which a culture of solidarity was constructed.
Another approach, the use of framing processes to help participants make sense of their social world, has been developed by Scott Hunt, Robert Benford and David Snow (1994: 190). This approach recognizes that collective action must be constructed and not assumed (Melucci, 1989), and then “collective action frames focus attention on a particular situation considered problematic, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, and articulates an alternative set of arrangements including what the movement actors need to do in order to affect the desired change” (Hunt, Benford and Snow, 1994: 190); in other words, the framing process also helps develop individual and collective identities (Hunt, Benford and Snow, 1994).
With the above explicated, it is time to turn to considering how groups are constructed for the purpose of engaging in collective action, and then sharing the resulting political perspective with others, in efforts to expand their social impact. To do this, the focus is shifted to research that has been developed generally in the study of social movements.
Attention must be focused on the work of Alberto Melucci. Melucci (1989, 1995, 1996) questions the very basis of much established social movement research, arguing that a major weakness of this research is that movements have been generally treated as empirical realities, as though they already exist. He believes researchers need to recognize the constitutive processes by which they are constructed; i.e., that if one wants to understand the emergence and development of social movements, then a movement should not be treated as a given but rather focus should be on how it has been built. In fact, the central focus of his research has been to understand the processes of how collective action is created (Melucci, 1996).
Melucci uses cultural explanations to do this. Two concepts central to his thinking of how movements emerge are (1) the creation of a collective identity by a group and, then (2), the process by which the group chooses to engage in collective action. And while these two concepts are not necessarily distinct empirically, it helps to disaggregate them for analytical purposes.
Collective identity
Social movements emerge, Melucci argues, as people recognize the need to think about society and their social experiences differently than they have in the past [see also Mueller, 1994], whether from a change in social situation or from a different understanding of an existing one. Further, individual activity is crucial to the creation of collective identity, and he argues that creation of a collective identity is a precursor for consciously collective action, meaning action that is built on solidarity.
The concept of collective identity is important because it allows one to understand “how social actors come to form a collectivity and recognize themselves as part of it” (Melucci, 1996: 69). In other words, creating a collective identity is central to helping people establish meaning for themselves and their actions.
Melucci defines collective identity as “an integrative and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level) and concerned with the orientations of action and the field of opportunities and constraints” in which the proposed action is to possibly take place (Melucci, 1995: 44). He sees this as a process that includes a “notion of unity, which establishes the limit of a subject and distinguishes it from all others,” but he also recognizes that “a certain degree of emotional investment” is required in creating collective identity, which means that participation in collective identity can never be totally negotiable. He continues: “The notion of identity always refers to these three features: the continuity of a subject over and beyond variations of time and its adaptations to the environment; the delegitimization of this subject with respect to others; the ability to recognize and be recognized” (Melucci, 1995: 45).
In other words, developing a group collective identity is a process of individuals getting together, finding a common interest/positions, deciding to work together, committing to work together for a set period of time (this is the emotional part, which can be extended over longer periods of time, if desired), and then seeing themselves as a group that is more than just the sum of its parts—and recognizing that the group is different and distinct from others.
Creating a collective identity, an on-going process, is important: success allows potential actors to act together in ways that enable them to be in control of their own actions, and that is why it is important to understand on a theoretical level:
… one cannot treat collective identity as a ‘thing,’ as the monolithic unity of a subject; one must instead conceive of it as a system of relations and representations. Collective identity takes the form of a field containing a system of vectors in tension. These vectors constantly seek to establish an equilibrium between the various axes of collective action and between identification that an actor declares, and the identification given by the rest of society (adversaries, allies, third parties).
Collective identity in its concrete form depends on how this set of relations is held together. This system is never a definitive datum; it is instead a laborious process in which unity and equilibrium are reestablished in reaction to shifts and changes in the elements internal and external to the field (Melucci, 1995: 50).
From the above, the creation of collective identity is a process by which—through interaction and negotiation (and sometimes conflict)—individuals together create meaning for themselves by their participation in the group. This process is both cognitive and emotional, and the emotional component ensures that the process is never only a rational one but is non-rational—not anti-rational—as well. This process develops a unity, a group, and ensures both the distinctiveness of the group and provides joint recognition to group members, and recognizes that the group is located within a contextual field of opportunities for and constraints against action. This is an on-going process that is never completely “settled,” so the group must always devote some energies to ensuring the on-going well-being of the group and the collective identity.
Collective action
Melucci recognizes the interactive process between individuals that leads to collective identity and then, through on-going negotiation and renegotiation, the process that can lead to collective action once the group decides to act. Melucci sees movements not as entities with a “unity of goals” but rather as “action systems”: They are systems of action, complex networks among the different levels or meanings of social action” (Melucci, 1995: 53). This means that any social movement (or in this case, group) should not be seen as a monolithic, unified whole, but rather should be seen as having a multiplicity of politics, interpretations, possibly ideologies, etc., out of which a common politics is negotiated and from which action is constructed. But he also recognizes the interactive process that occurs between conflicting sub-groups within a group, and then the negotiation and renegotiation within each group as a result of the conflict (Melucci, 1989). Central to this interactive process of collective identity and collective action is ensuring that each works to develop the other. Engaging in actions that reinforce or enhance the collective identity depends on ensuring that these actions are built on solidarity (see also Fantasia, 1988).
In other words, individuals create groups (i.e., organization) and, at some point in time, take action—at the same time, taking some level of individual risk—to further advance the struggle toward attaining their goals. By doing this, they notify the public of their issues and concerns, attempt to neutralize opponents, and to win those in the “middle” of their audience to move to support the their side.[xiv] As this process becomes more and more successful,[xv] winning more people to the group’s side and, hopefully, enlarging the group, this enhances the group’s social power, making it more likely for them, over time, to attain their particular goal.[xvi]
By engaging in conflictive collective action, “the internal solidarity of the group reinforces identity and guarantees it.” At the same time, “The solidarity that ties individuals to each other enables them to affirm themselves as subjects of their action and to withstand the breakdown of social relations induced by the conflict” (Melucci, 1996: 74). In short, “collective identity is then becoming even more conspicuously the product of conscious action and the outcome of self-reflection” (Melucci, 1996: 76; Fantasia, 1988).
The above, however, only focuses on how a group comes together, establishes a collective identity, acts, and then enhances its collective identity through collective action.
Framing
An additional step—not advanced by Melucci, but which I argue is essential—is then “framing” the collective action (Hunt, Benford and Snow, 1994) so as to both encourage movement from the “neutral” to the “positive” section of the “audience,” but also to prevent and/or undermine counter-movements that might seek to undermine these challenges (see Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996). This is basically providing a narrative (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010), justifying your mobilization and action, and encouraging others to join the process.
And the purpose is…?
What, then, is the purpose of such collective action, beyond enhancing its collective identity? Melucci sees social movement actions as “communicative acts,” as exposing power and domination to observation in ways not regularly attained (Melucci, 1996: 79), but generally limited to that. However, I see no reason for such a limitation; yes, social movements can expose power and domination, yet social movements have motivated social change in the United States and around the world, ranging from “reformist” to “revolutionary.” So, yes, they might only expose power and domination in some situations, but they can also instigate qualitative social change.
With understanding that people have multiple identities; that these identities can be on individual, collective and public dimensions; that they can be developed either through normative subcultures or framing processes; that they can be mobilized to create group solidarity; and that they can be used to initiate widespread social change, the section above in which we delved into group creation obviously becomes salient.
In other words, we can now theoretically explicate how social change from the bottom-up takes place. This understanding—collective identity, collective action, and framing—is so powerful that it can detail how social change takes place, being able to explain the development of emancipatory social movements or reactionary social movements.
A Polyconflictual Model of Society has been proposed, based on social processes, and the rejection of structural categorization, that both foregrounds individual choice and actions in any particular situation, and recognizes the necessity to build collective action based on the development of collective identity, as a way to resist and/or challenge social oppression or to extend or maintain such oppression.
Synopsis
Polyconflictualism is a flexible model of society and varies situation-by-situation. It does not privilege any one oppression nor exclude any, nor does it place members of society into any one social category. Thus, it requires that in the first step of analysis, analysts must “descend” from the category level to consider the individual.
Recognizing two forms of social power—dominative or top-down power, and emancipatory or bottom-up power—the Polyconflictual model argues that in each situation, individuals must choose whether to support dominative power or emancipatory power. However, it also recognizes that individuals can be internally inconsistent, supporting emancipatory power in one situation or even at one time, and dominative in another.
Yet, this approach does not remain content to stay at an individual level—in the second step of the analysis, it is necessary to return to the group level. This means that analysts must “reconstruct” groups, but this time, to reconstruct them on the basis of understanding how they are actually constructed, from processes within the group. This includes looking at the group-building process both internally (at both the individual and at the group levels) and externally, in how they seek to extend their political analysis and action to the point where they are adopted by others who, hopefully, will then join them in their chosen campaigns/struggles, even in the face of “countermovements” and/or governmental repression.
“Returning” to the group level is essential—this approach cannot stay at the individual level. While resistance to oppression initially takes place on an individual level, it cannot be maintained over a long period of time: to have a chance to do that, one must be part of a group. This means that a group must be constructed, whether by using ideological or framing processes to help such construction.
To sum up: Polyconflictualism is a dynamic, process-based model of society that allows for explanation of the emergence of social power from the “bottom” of society, from “below.” Arguably, it provides a much more accurate theoretical representation of social developments in any social order than do structural-based models, and it can explain the processes of social change—and why it does or does not take place—which structural models simply cannot. Accordingly, it recognizes that sociologists cannot predict social behavior, although it can be more accurately understood.
It recognizes that individuals choose whether to engage in emancipatory actions or not, that those who wish to engage in emancipatory actions seek like-minded people for the purposes of possibly engaging in collective action, who can take action and, when done, seek to develop an understanding within the active group of what they did, using it to strengthen and enhance the group, while trying to project it outside the group to build support and win adherents while neutralizing opponents’ counter efforts. Thus, Polyconflictualism can explain why people engage in or do not engage in social change activities, and why some people come to support these activities, while others oppose them.[xvii]
CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING THE WAVES OF PROTEST—AND MORE
At the beginning of this paper, it was argued that there had been this tremendous upsurge from the bottom of multiple social orders upwards since the mid-1980s, in the US and in a number of countries around the world. And it was stated that mainstream sociology today cannot theoretically explain these developments.
The argument herein, discussing the structural paradigm in sociology, is that neither of the two existing macrosociological models of society—structural functionalism nor structural conflict models—can theoretically explain these developments; most importantly, they cannot explain how people gained the power to overthrow dictators, challenge an empire and various social orders, elect outsiders to national offices, or stimulate the largest upsurge in the US ever.
To challenge existing macrosociological theory, a new processural-based model, Polyconflictualism, has been presented, a model of society that can explain these developments. It was argued that there was a two-step process to build power from below: (1) create a better way to represent how a social order really works, which is based on individual decisions being made by members to engage/not engage in social developments; and (2) for those who want to engage and try to advance the struggle for social change, they could help increase their chances for success by organizing groups and ultimately a series of groups as a power-building process from below.
This recognition that social power can be built from below is what delineates Polyconflictualism from either of the structural models: it allows us to theoretically explain how ordinary individuals have been able to create such power from below that they have changed history in their respective countries and, sometimes, around the globe.
Perhaps most crucially in this process, Polyconflictualism disaggregates the Weberian concept of power on which Sociology has built, and argues that there are, in reality, two forms of power, not just one: top-down or dominative power (i.e., Weber’s conceptualization) and bottom-up or emancipatory power. With this bifurcation of the concept of power, we can now theoretically explain the emergence and sometimes success of social movements and their components around the world.
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[i] As will soon be seen, this author advances a new process-based model of society, which is called a Polyconflictual model or Polyconflictualism. (The name sees multiple antagonistic conflicts in a social order, while not a-prioritizing any.)
However, he is not trying to colonize the concept of processural paradigm. Should his Polyconflictual model be established, he is certain there will be—sooner or later—completing models will be advanced that also fit under this paradigm; accordingly, Polyconflictualism is only seen as the first of possibly multiple processural models.
[ii] Again, see Endnote 11, above.
[iii] To elaborate and hopefully further clarify what is meant: a child will generally accept the values, mores, and world views of her/his family up until adolescence, approximately 12 years of age. With that time, with more education and with wider social circulation and enlarged friendship networks, young people begin questioning, and sometimes challenging, those same values and mores; and over time, decide to accept, modify, or challenge those things they once unquestionably accepted. For example, most American children have been told not to engage in sexual activities with others before marriage….
For an excellent study that illuminates some of these processes, see Smetana, et. al., 2006. Thanks to Kayla M. Vasilko for finding and sharing this with me.
[iv] Along with the many factors that could be included within a particular situation—as are deemed relevant to the subject at hand by the researcher/analyst—there is also the perceptiveness of the researcher/analyst and the skill at observation and competence of such person. So, the quality of understanding of any one situation could be affected by the researcher herself/himself.
Thanks to Kayla M. Vasilko for encouraging me to include the concept of “factors” in this understanding of differing situations.
[v] In a review of “Feminist Theory Today,” Kathy E. Ferguson (2017) explores what she describes as “irreplaceable” analytic tools— “intersectionality, interdisciplinarity, and the intertwinings of scholarship and activism”—and she states she sees these tools “as fundamental to sound feminist thinking in that they provide the implicit orientation toward inquiry that facilitates nondualistic, processural, change-oriented theories” (Ferguson, 2017: 270). This, as will be seen below, is similar to some of the things being put forth herein.
However, in no place does Ferguson identify any theorist who has rejected structural models of society, nor does she identify any theorist who has advanced a specific macrosociological theoretical explanation based on these attributes.
[vi] Social scientists can, however, still recognize that social behavior can penalize or discriminate against groups of people who share similar attributes (such as race or gender), but this must be empirically verified, not just theoretically proclaimed as an essential process. This why the concept of “social class”—whether as developed by Marx, Weber, Warner, Wright, or many others—has never been universally accepted in Sociology: empirical data does not support the concept.
Likewise, albeit differentially developed because of (generally) observable physical differences, while empirical research has established oppression and discrimination based on race and gender, this does not explain the diminutions of such oppression subsequent to the Civil Rights/Black Power and Women’s Movements of the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s, and the ramifications of such since then. In other words, the oppression based on race and gender today differs qualitatively from their respective historical development before these movements, although certainly neither sets of oppression have been eradicated.
[vii] Thus, a historical materialist understanding is necessary, but not sufficient.
[viii] This disaggregating the concept of “power” is extremely important for this project: it allows us to see there is more than one type of power, and it allows us to theoretically explicate the concept of “power from below,” which recognizes the social power that can be generated by social movements. Recognizing this, we can now theoretically understand the “emancipatory power” generated by social movements.
This author has substituted new terminology for Fiske’s original terminology. Fiske’s “imperializing power” (p. 11) has been superseded with “dominative power,” and “localizing power” (p. 12) has been replaced with “emancipatory power.” The author believes this terminology is superior to Fiske’s, while maintaining the general idea of Fiske’s work.
[ix] Here I am obviously painting with a very broad brush, and this is nothing more than a expansive generalization to give a starting point for the discussion.
[x] Although some would argue that all members of a social group “automatically” come to a group-initiated understanding—say all African Americans see white racism, for example—the reality is that all African Americans do not see the world the same way nor, even if they see it, do they understand it the same way. Assuming this solitary response deprives each person of their individual agency.
Similarly, not all women (or men) see sexually explicit video material (aka “pornography”) as offensive.
[xi] And has arguably done by US President Donald J. Trump (2017-2021, 2025- ).
[xii] Thus. the importance of the rise, continuation and expansion of “alternative” media, particularly in the United States. See, for example, Downing (2001) and Lievrouw (2011) as introduction to contestory media studies.
[xiii] Scott states specifically that his is not a Parsonian approach. See also Fantasia, 1988.
[xiv] This is based on the understanding that when initiating anything “different” from the status quo is advanced to an “outside audience”—i.e., those who have no involvement in formulating the project, but whom organizers seek to recruit—there are almost always three sets of responses: (1) one group—perhaps about 10 percent of the chosen audience—will respond positively to the proposed project; (2) another group—again about 10 percent—will respond negatively; and a third group—perhaps 80 percent—simply will not respond or will ignore the proposed new project. Our goal, as organizers, is to move those in the non-involved group into the approve group; we don’t waste time to try to move the negatives into the positive group, but rather focus on the “neutrals,” and try to get them involved.
[xv] Key to the “success” of any social movement—and one that organizers have little control over—is the salience of the issue confronting the audience one is trying to mobilize. If the potential audience deems the issue as being salient to them, then good organizing can result in successful organization and/or organization and possibly winning some of not all of the movement’s demands. If the issue is not deemed salient, success will become that less likely, if not impossible.
[xvi] At each step, after a collective action (in public), then there must be a way to incorporate those who want to join the group into the group, so there needs to be a defined process as to how this can be done established in advance of the collective action. And these new members need to know how they can get fully empowered should they wish.
The importance of this is clear: many people, if not most, are unwilling to participate over time in a group in which they have no “say” in determining future developments.
[xvii] The emergence of “challenging” groups is not theoretically limited to those pushing emancipatory projects; this process also can explain the emergence of reactionary projects, including the processes leading to the storming of the Capitol in Washington, DC, on January 6, 2021. Press reports of the action report that those engaging in the assault used their own definition and language of “oppression,” and solutions thereto, but the processes of creating groups from below and then amalgamating into larger groups certainly appears similar if not the same. Further comment is beyond the scope of this paper.