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Ecology, Politics and Freedom: André Gorz and the Challenges of Political Ecology (A Report on the International Conference)

The article summarizes the contributions to an international conference dedicated to the French thinker and ecologist Andre Gorz that was held in Bratislava, Slovakia. The article focuses especially on the conference’s emphasis on degrowth in the context of Gorz’s philosophy.

Written by

Greg Evans

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in

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Originally Published in

Green Social Thought

In an excerpt from his book Anthropause recently published in Green Social Thought, Stan Cox writes that:

“[in 1972] the Austrian philosopher André Gorz coined the term décroissance, referring to the degrowth of material production. Interest in degrowth gradually increased over the decades that followed, but starting in the early 2010s, the degrowth movement began to spread widely. Degrowth is now the subject of hundreds of articles in academic journals, shelves full of books, and the open-source Degrowth Journal.”

That the degrowth movement had spread as wide and far as Cox states was made apparent to me in the fall of 2023 when I had the opportunity to attend and make a presentation at a conference in Europe that was devoted to the philosophy of the aforementioned André Gorz. At the time I was, in fact, much surprised by the extent to which the theme of the conference, though it was titled “Ecology, Politics and Freedom: André Gorz and the Challenges of Political Ecology,” could have been titled (or certainly sub-titled) “André Gorz and Degrowth.”

My surprise was, in part, a result of the fact that I had fallen out of the loop on issues of political ecology since leaving the Green Social Thought editorial board in 2014. But it was also a result of the fact that Gorz himself – though he might have coined the term, and though many of his ideas might constitute what we might now call degrowth thinking – did not articulate or develop the term in his own discussions of “ecology, politics, and freedom.” Nevertheless, the entire second half of the conference’s program was devoted to the topic of degrowth, as were four of the seven articles that appeared in the book that was published from the papers presented at the conference.

But the conference acted as more than a catch-up for me, as its participants made a number of important observations regarding Gorz in the context of degrowth and ecological politics in general. Indeed, important enough that I think them worth reporting on, and that is what I propose to do here.

Gorz in the History of Degrowth Thought

By way of background, the conference was held in Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, in September of 2023 and the book that came out of it (and which I will be using here as the primary source) was published a year later (Ekologia, Politika a Sloboda) and is available online for those who read Czech or Slovak. The conference was hosted by, and the book published by, the Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and so it will come as no surprise that Gorz, and degrowth, were primarily, though certainly not entirely, addressed from a philosophical point of view.

And, given how I’ve situated the conference in the context of Gorz and degrowth, the paper most appropriate to discuss first would be Daniel Costa Jařab’s “Andre Gorz in the History of Degrowth Thought.” Jařab, a Czech-Brazilian environmental activist studying at Masaryk University in the Czech Republic, asks  first whether Gorz was the “founder” of the degrowth movement, to which he answers that, though Gorz can perhaps be credited with first expressing the concept of degrowth (when, in 1972, he asked whether “the earth’s balance, for which no-growth – or even degrowth [décroissance] – of material production is a necessary condition, compatible with the survival of the capitalist system?”), it is hard to say that this represents the founding of a movement since the birth of the degrowth movement proper can only be traced to 2002 in a context Gorz did not directly contribute to, and the English word “degrowth” does not appear until it was used at a conference in Paris in 2008.

Jařab however writes that there is no doubt that Gorz was instrumental in laying the philosophical foundations for the degrowth movement because of his “ability to connect lines of thought and his almost prophetic talent for grasping the spirit of the times before it became apparent” and that, indeed, “almost every topic that degrowth addresses today can be found in Gorz’s work” as he was able “to recognize the emerging neoliberalism, precaritization and, towards the end of his life [Gorz died in 2007], approach of technofeudalism.” (All translations are mine unless otherwise noted.)

An additional aspect of Gorz’s writing that Jařab highlights is that Gorz’s approach, though his analysis is not lacking in statistics, is first and foremost philosophical, and in this way manifests “one of the clear differences between the Anglo-Saxon and French branches of degrowth. While the Anglo-Saxon branch of degrowth thinking was founded by ‘hard scientists’ or economists (Dennis and Donella Meadows, for example, or Herman Daly), the French branch was founded by philosophers and anthropologists.” The Anglo-Saxon approach, that is to say, is typified by cybernetic models and economic analysis while the French “deconstruct the premises of productivism and capitalism or, in the words of the French writer Serge Latouche, ‘decolonize the imaginary.’”

And this decolonialization, Jařab argues, is precisely what Gorz achieves – especially in connection with the concept of modernity. This can be seen in our relationship to technology. Whereas the techno-optimists, what we might now call the “green new dealers,” essentially try to green the traditional modernist relationship to growth, holding that we can largely continue, and will want to continue, on our current path so long as we can implement “sustainable growth” accomplished through technological advancements (solar power, EVs, etc.), the traditionalists (especially the so-called “back to nature” types) in general reject modernism and technology. The degrowth movement, however, is characterized by an ambivalence as it is, according to Jařab, “a twofold movement. It cannot be declared anti-modern, but it is inherently critical of modernity, progress, and economic ‘rationality.’ This dichotomy is evident in the history of degrowth thought, and it is therefore not surprising that there have been efforts to deny or overcome this dichotomy.” And so it is only natural that it might turn to Gorz to overcome this dichotomy, for Gorz’s “utopia is somehow hybrid, combining modernity with tradition, counting on the one hand on the state and the industrial production of basic commodities while on the other hand trying to cure the ills of modernity … by attempting to synthesize various critiques of modernity and create a coherent and comprehensive critique of modernity and its influence on peoples’ work and lives.”

The Political Ecology of André Gorz

Gorz himself often placed his thoroughgoing critique of the premises of productivism and capitalism under the rubric of political ecology, and Petr Daubner, as the title of his article indicates (“On the Political Ecology of André Gorz”), focuses on Gorz’s influence on the degrowth movement in that framework.

Arguing that the contemporary world finds itself in a complex, multidimensional, and polyvalent global crisis whose primary cause “can be considered the ideology, imperative or paradigm of (especially economic) growth” and that “the relationship between capitalist growth, accelerated by industrialization, the use of fossil energy sources and environmental destruction, opened the door to the epoch of the Anthropocene,” Daubner (who was the conference organizer and is a researcher at the Department of Environmental Philosophy at the Slovak Academy of Sciences) concludes that, in essence, “global capitalism threatens the very existence of civilization.” And it is the discipline of political ecology – which “emerged as an independent discipline in the field of social sciences in the 1960s and 70s under the influence of the developing environmental crisis” – that provides a key critique of this mantra of growth. Dealing as it does with the links and interactions between nature and political, economic, and social “drivers,” political ecology “has opened the door to examining the complex of socio-environmental conflicts that generate capitalist appropriation of nature and its renewable and non-renewable resources.” Importantly, it also represents an explicit alternative to “apolitical” ecology.

The aim of Daubner’s study is thus to “point out the relevance and timeliness of the political, social, economic, and, last but not least, ecological or political-ecological thinking” of Gorz as a founding figure of political ecology, which becomes all the more important in the Slovak context as Gorz had not, up until recently, been given adequate attention there (indeed, the conference was in part inspired by the recent translation into Slovak and publication of Gorz’s 1977 book Ecologie et politique).

Daubner further specifies Gorz as being representative of a post-Marxist-oriented political ecology that arises mainly under the influence of, in Gorz’s own words, the “ecological critique of economic rationality” and the so-called “second contradiction of capital,” that is, as J. O’Connor (in Natural Causes: Essays in Ecological Marxism, 1998) put it, “the absolute general law of the deterioration of the environment under capitalism.”

But within political ecology there are other “explanatory narratives” to be had, and it remains a question as to which one will gain a hegemonic position in the discourse about the environmental problems caused by the way that human activities are transforming the planet (that is, the concept of the Anthropocene). Will it be, Daubner asks, market environmentalism, ecological modernization, or ecological socialism? Of course, the first two – primarily, if not exclusively, focusing on concepts such as “sustainable development” and “green energy” – have predominated in the public discourse up until now. Gorz however advocated for the importance of the third, arguing that it was necessary to overcome the “economic rationality” and “productivism of neoliberal capitalism.” In this way, he is representative of eco-socialist discourse.

Daubner, in the article, provides an exhaustive presentation of contemporary writers and thinkers on these matters, and in this context an especially interesting point for me in the current, AI data center hellscape we have recently entered is one raised by the Chinese academic Xueming Chen, the author of The Ecological Crisis and the Logic of Capital, who “considers the ecological crisis to be an inherent and fundamental crisis of capitalist society that is closely linked to the system itself” and that it cannot be expected “that a transnational capitalist class that has an extraordinary interest in the continuation of the accumulation of capital will lead humanity out of this crisis.” Daubner similarly discusses Hickel and Sullivan’s point (in the journal World Development Perspectives, 2024) that, in capitalism, rich “investors” decide on production, with the primary goal being to maximize private profits rather than to fulfill social, ecological, or environmental goals.

Indeed, I believe that because of the “AI boom” these latter two points have become the most intensely topical of all the arguments presented at the conference. This is because, in spite of its sheer ecological destructiveness, the build out of AI infrastructure is being promulgated in large part by many of the very rich investors (in this case from the tech sector) who, a few short years ago, were advocating low-carbon emission and green technology solutions. But, of course, as Hickel and Sullivan pointed out in the above passage, these investors decide on production primarily to maximize profits. And so they all too easily (and eagerly) shifted from their green technology focus (which had been their wedge against the still monolithic, traditional, lower-tech, extractive energy-sector) to the maximal profit potential, indeed investment bubble, offered by AI. This holds true even when the data center demands for energy and water required by AI put their previously stated ecological and environmental goals into the rubbish heap.

It is only in the third section of his article that Daubner systematically links Gorz’s ecosocialism with the degrowth movement. Building on the argument of the French sociologist and philosopher Bruno Latour, who wrote that “Neither socialism nor the ecological movement (…) figured out how to effectively join forces, and so, despite the fact that the goal of both was to reverse the cycle of history, they were only able to slow down its operation,” Daubner writes:

“Paradoxically, in the past, there was only very limited intellectual dialogue between the concept of degrowth and Marxist-inspired thought, primarily due to the alleged ‘Prometheanism’ that many believe is present in classical Marxism. This is gradually changing. Today, the degrowth movement and concept, alongside the movement and concept of eco-socialism, represent two of the most significant proposals, concepts, and movements on the radical side of the ecological and political spectrum in the 21st century. Despite the fact that not everyone in the degrowth movement identifies as a socialist, and not everyone who identifies as a socialist or Marxist is truly convinced that the concept of degrowth is appropriate, in the academic world a growing tendency toward mutual respect and rapprochement between the two ‘camps’ is clearly visible …  This tendency is, in my view, understandable because, as I have argued elsewhere, capitalism cannot exist without growth. Capitalism requires permanent expansion of production and consumption, accumulation of capital and maximization of profits. In the Anthropocene  era, this leads to a global environmental crisis, changes in the climate and, ultimately, threatens the environmental conditions of human life on the planet.”

And it is here that Gorz emerges as a (or perhaps the) key figure, as Daubner explains:

“The concept of degrowth, for example, attempts to systematically respond to the problem of environmental unsustainability of economic growth, and/or unemployment by proposing a reduction in working hours and alternative forms of work that are combined with an unconditional basic income – proposals inspired, inter alia, by Gorz, who argued, for example, that ‘the right to an income should no longer be identified with the right to a wage’. The reduction of working hours without wage reductions, which are advocated by the degrowth movement and which was convincingly defended by Gorz, is – quite clearly – contrary to the interests of capital. Gorz placed his hopes on the possibility of expanding the sphere of autonomous activities through reduced working hours, thereby shrinking the domain dominated exclusively by ‘economic rationality.’ As Gorz argued, humanity’s goal cannot be ‘to work and produce for its own sake,’ but rather ‘to work and produce less while living better.’ This is the aim of ecological socialism, which, in his own words, seeks to ‘…politically restore the correlation between less work and less consumption on the one hand, and greater autonomy and existential security on the other, for everyone.’”

In this way, Daubner concludes, a full-on, systemic ecological-socialist strategy might have the potential to fulfill the needs of all people while at the same time putting humanity on a trajectory toward global, environmental sustainability.   

Degrowth as a sociological and ecological way out

Of course, irrespective of the issue of it joining with ecosocialism, the concept of degrowth first and foremost developed as the antithesis of “economic growth.” And two of the articles from the book address the attraction, and ultimate folly, of the general, monolithic – indeed almost religious belief – in economic growth.

Richard Stahel, in his article “The Concept of Degrowth and Sociological-Ecological Transformation,” quotes the American-Czech philosopher Erazím Kohak in this regard (with its reminder that “expansion” is another catchword used in this growth context):

“For about four centuries, we believed that expansion would solve all problems. Sometimes we understood it as a colonial expansion into the farthest corners of the world, at other times as technological development, and always as an escalation of material consumption for a privileged part of humanity. This strategy clashes with the finiteness of the Earth.”

Stahel also cites Bruno Latour’s highlighting of the dangerous, contradictory absurdity of such growth in the wake of the signing of the (non-binding) Paris Climate accords in 2015: “…on that day, all the signatory countries … realized with alarm that, if they all went ahead according to the terms of their respective modernization plans, there would be no planet compatible with their hopes for development.”

Stahel himself (who is the director of Philosophical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, additionally notable for his frequent commentaries on climate change and ecology that appear in Pravda, a leading Slovak daily) argues that “If the resources and absorption capacity of the planet’s ecological system are limited, it is not even theoretically possible to count on a society built on constant growth to be sustainable in the long term.” Thus, even if we could, for example, “import” non-renewable raw materials from outer space (as some have proposed), we would still be confronted by “the limited ability of the planet’s system to absorb pollution” produced by the additional human activity made possible by those imported raw materials, since “any human activity not only consumes resources, but also produces pollution.” Thus, the inherent problem of growth, and the dilemma of our belief in it.

Hence, the necessity of, as Stahej puts it, “degrowth as a form of socio-ecological transformation.” One in which, for example, “high-income states can no longer take for granted … the current practices of building the welfare of their own citizens by devastating the environment and plundering the natural human resources of low-income countries,” and the concept of degrowth becomes “an attempt to formulate an alternative paradigm within which economic-political institutions and socio-ecological relations can be rebuilt” to end or slow down these processes of planetary destruction. Otherwise, “as long as public policies continue to submit to the imperative of growth and the fictions of unlimited resources or the infinite capacity of a planetary system to absorb all forms of pollution, all so-called green policies or transformations will remain not only rhetorical exercises, but also more or less sophisticated forms of greenwashing.”

Ivan Buraj, in his article, “Degrowth as an Alternative and as a Way Out: Based on the Philosophy of Andre Gorz,” proceeds along similar lines (Buraj, professor emeritus at Comenius University in Bratislava, was the keynote speaker at the conference).

He too notes the “grow or die” paradigm, writing that “capitalism not only cannot do without economic growth, it cannot do without sustained economic growth” and that we all have the experience under the realities and conditions of capitalism that growth is equated (and often correctly) with material prosperity and non-growth with stagnation, unemployment and poverty. But, in addition to this, as Latour pointed out, “‘growth’ is a beautiful word, it is even a term for everything that is born, the meaning of life itself! Nothing will make me associate ‘degrowth’ with any kind of progress in the quality of life.’”

And given that growth both seems to be an iron law and the guarantor of material prosperity of the economic system that dominates our lives and civilization, as well an idea that taps into the biological and botanical mystique of growth, it is hardly surprising that some might think it best to go with the flow and start advocating for “green technology” and “sustainable growth.” But since these approaches are not (as Stahel also showed) going to solve the ecological crisis and degrowth potentially could, the question then becomes: “Can degrowth be made attractive?” For, as Burej writes, “people continue to adhere to an unchanged way of life not because they (or at least many) are not aware of the more or less imminent threat of harmful and at the same time irreversible climate change, but because they are unable to, do not feel ready for, or are still not sufficiently motivated to make fundamental changes in their (consumerist) behavior.” Especially when, as Latour writes, ecology (and by extension degrowth) is “boring or preaching. It is soaked in moralism. It isn’t exciting. It doesn’t mobilize. That is why we call it ‘punishing.’” And so, Burej asks, how can degrowth become more attractive to people in general, much less to the “the poorer, the unemployed, the socially excluded,” than growth is? Indeed, how can it become “attractive enough for people to have a reason to go after it, fight for it, or in some way sacrifice themselves for it?”

Various possibilities of how this might be done are suggested by Buraj. Emphasizing the need for a conceptual change, he suggests a delinking of the concepts of growth and progress, writing that “a fundamental and comprehensive solution to the global ecological and climate crisis requires … a radical change in the logic of the system based on growth and with it the assertion of degrowth, if not as the only possible alternative to solving them, then at least the most consistent and comprehensive one.”

One step on the pathway toward this delinking, he suggests, might be the use of Claude Levi-Strauss’s argument that the progress of humanity is not a one-way, one dimensional, necessary, nor continuous process, but a contradictory one with unexpected twists and turns. That, in fact, the history of the world, taken as a whole, has taken place more horizontally than vertically, leading Buraj  to conclude that we need “horizontal, more uniformly-oriented development rather than vertical growth” in which “degrowth is not negative growth, but rather development without unilateral (economic) growth.”

Buraj also points to how the concept of the “good life” was already “a key philosophical question in antiquity, and as a rule, its concept was associated with restraint, or moderation, with the taming of passions and the limitation of needs. More precisely, it was about the limitation of material needs”. Indeed, among the ancient thinkers “there is not even a mention of (economic) growth as a condition for a good life.”

And it is here that Gorz comes into full play, as Burej introduces Gorz’s argument that the only way we can all live better is to produce less, consume less, work less, spend less, in short, “to live differently.” [16]

But, of course, to live differently we must think differently, and so it becomes necessary to address the philosophical question more directly.

Gorz, Rationality, and Degrowth

Jařab and Burej touched on aspects of Gorz’s philosophy, and Daubner stated in his article that “academic discussions on the concept of degrowth, but also on ecological socialism, which were and are significantly inspired by the thinking of Gorz, are reviving Marxist, neo- and post-Marxist political, economic, social, environmental and, last but not least, philosophical thinking (my italics).” It was, however, František Novosád, researcher at the Institute of Philosophy and former editor-in-chief of the journal Filozofie, who in his article “About the Non-Obviousness of the Obvious” addresses Gorz’s philosophical thinking most directly.

Novosád first explores the ambivalence, the almost dual sensibility, that humanity has had toward nature and how this has played out over time. The phenomenon of nature, he writes, “has always played an ambivalent role in discourses about the relation of man to being. Nature was what we wanted to emancipate ourselves from, but it was also what we wanted to return to. We admired the natural and rejected the artificial. At other times, we despised the natural and admired the artificial.” Thus, while philosophers such as Francis Bacon and René Descartes believed that science and science-related technologies will make man the master and owner of nature, others were not so sure (e.g. Malthus). Marx was certainly well aware of the destructive potential of capitalism in relation to nature, but he believed that its internal limits would intervene long before it had a chance to destroy nature (I assume Novosád is referring here to Marx’s argument that the capitalist mode of production generates inherent antagonisms that would culminate in systemic crises and, ultimately, the system’s being transcended). Gorz, who “greens Marx,” did not so much see capitalism encountering such internal limits but rather external ones in the form of the limited capacity of the natural world (the Earth’s ecosystem) to absorb the blows that a capitalist humanity inflicts upon it. Thus, in Gorz’s view, the driving force of change will be the awareness of the consequences of our collective action, and thus ecological necessity will ultimately “force humanity to reason”, to the realization that “it cannot go on like this”; Gorz thus “sees a way out of the disturbed relationship of humanity to the natural conditions of its existence in a change in the criteria of rationality.”

And if this all sounds rather abstract, it actually isn’t, as our use of “reason” and “rationality” is the way, in this view, that we situate ourselves in the world, and is thus a historical and social phenomenon. As Novosád explains it:

“What was considered reasonable yesterday may today be considered madness, an irrational act. In the late Middle Ages and early modern times, a decisive part of society was convinced that burning witches was a reasonable thing to do; today, even an attempt to justify the rationality of something like this would be qualified as a criminal offense […] Historical forms of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘common sense’, also differ according to which symbolic form plays a decisive role in a given era and society. In the Middle Ages, the concept of rationality was determined at the level of religion: action in ‘this’ world was measured by its consequences for the situation of the actor in ‘the other’ world. Gradually, since the 15th century, the center of gravity of human life has shifted to ‘this’ world, and the concept of rationality has changed and differentiated accordingly.

“What is rational and what is not is today primarily determined in the economic sphere, in the space of the capitalist market. The rationality of an action is determined by the ratio between costs and revenues, that is, profit or loss. An action is rational when it ‘pays off’. Thus, where revenues exceed costs, we achieve profit and are dealing with rational action. Where costs exceed revenues, we achieve loss and are dealing with irrational action.

“The concept of rationality derived from the functioning of the capitalist market expands into all spheres of life. In this concept, supply determines demand.”

And, Novosád further explains, where supply determines demand, “the main branch of modern industry is, literally, the production of new needs.” But Gorz “is convinced that it is possible to change the structure of demand by neutralizing the aggressiveness of supply,” that it is possible to envisage a society where a different rationality has come to prevail, one that tires of the “retaliatory blows” that results from its ignoring the external limits of nature, “the new diseases and new evils” and even, “despite the growing consumerism, the decreasing quality of life.”

“I think many of us would agree,” Novosád concludes, “that if the contemporary paradigm of production, distribution, and consumption changes, it will change in the way that André Gorz outlines. History is full of surprises. Mostly unpleasant ones. However, what if humanity does work its way towards forms of rationality different than the current ones? Let us hope that the idea of a possible radical change in the thinking and actions of key states, nations, classes, and strata is not just a lingering remnant of the notion that someone is, after all, watching over humanity.”

Ecological Realism

In my contribution – a presentation and article titled “Ecological Realism in Action: André Gorz and the 1970s American Counterculture” – I focus on a 1976 article by Gorz (“The Continuing American Revolution”) in which he discusses a number of Americans that he met on his travels in the United States in the 1970s. These people were leading what we might call countercultural or alternative lives, and Gorz uses them as examples of individuals who were, in their various ways, challenging the conventional forms of rationality. As I describe it:

“These Americans of whom Gorz was writing in the article were people who, in their lifestyle, attitudes, and economic practices, advocated, to use Gorzian terminology, greater well-being through the inversion of growth and the subversion of the prevailing, consumerist lifestyle. They were not seeking to maintain their current level of consumption, but to consume less and less, which is necessary, according to Gorz, to save the planet. In these ways, they seem to fit well under Gorz’s concept of ‘ecological realism’ as he articulated it in the first chapter of Ecology as Politics. Additionally, they seem well aware of Gorz’s contention in this regard that a lack of such realism ‘consists in imagining that economic growth can still bring about increased human welfare, and indeed that it is still physically possible.’”

In fact, I believe that the concept of “ecological realism” provides a particularly useful example of how such a paradigm change as Novosád discusses might come about. This because it turns our customary rationality regarding “realism” on its head, since usually, when we encounter the term in the context of anything political, it means, as Merriam Webster puts it, a “concern for fact or reality and rejection of the impractical and visionary” and thus suggests that we have to be “realistic” and accommodating in our demands with the powers that be. The phrase “ecological realism,” interpreted by such a rationality, would therefore mean making politically “reasonable” demands as regards ecological issues, demands that, even if they are substantially watered down from what is necessary, stand a reasonable chance of getting through Congress or Parliament or the Bundestag or whatever and become law.

But in the new rationality that Gorz is putting forth, “concern for fact or reality” has to do with the actual and future state of the planet’s climate and ecology, not the political reality of the moment or the fate of a particular policy. And, from the point of view of a Gorzian rationality, to think that economic growth “is still physically possible” without destroying the very habitat that we live in is to engage in impractical, unrealistic, and, in its own perverted and market-worshipping way, idealistic or “visionary” thinking.

Conclusion (and a modest proposal)

Stan Cox, in the excerpt from his book Anthropause that I cited at the beginning of this article, also describes how the French economist Timothée Parrique has grouped the various definitions of “degrowth” into three types:

“The first group—’environmentalist’— describes ‘degrowth as decline.’ This type puts ‘emphasis on that which should be reduced, e.g., production, material and energy consumption, economic activities, throughput, or anything else linked to environmental pressure.’ An example of this type of definition is ‘the intentional limiting and downscaling of the economy to make it consistent with biophysical boundaries’ …

“… the second, ‘revolutionary’ type of definition, or ‘degrowth as emancipation,’ stresses the societal ills, damages, and injustices that result from material overproduction and overconsumption and the relief that degrowth will provide.

“The third type is ‘the utopian definition,’ ‘degrowth as destination,’ or as Parrique also puts it, ‘degrowth for or to something . . . In this aspirational understanding of the term, degrowth is associated to a variety of desirable values (e.g. well-being, frugality, justice, sustainability, conviviality, freedom, democracy) that are to be achieved via a decline, an emancipation, or both.’”

After reviewing the papers presented at the conference, it is clear to me that there is much discussion, and overlapping, of the first two of these conceptualizations of degrowth.

Discussion on the third type is, however, far sparser. As we have been reading, various of the authors have hinted at it, none more so than Daubner, who in a passage cited earlier wrote that Gorz believed that humanity’s goal must be to produce less and live better at the same time.

However, the fact that none of the participants in the conference or contributors to the book ever fully addressed this utopian definition, as Parrique called it, is shown by the fact that the work in which Gorz most forcefully discussed this aspect of his thinking, Paths to Paradise, was only cited by one of the authors presenting papers. And even that author, who was me, presented it in the context of the ways in which a situation that Gorz felt embodied some of these aspirations (the American counterculture of the 1970s) did not, in the end, fulfill them.

Thus, Gorz’s working out of how we might all “work less so that we might live more” went largely undiscussed, as did his discussions on related points such as the difference between, and importance of, both autonomous and heteronomous labor; his proposal for the mass production of basic items alongside  localized, crafted production of more aesthetic items; and his critique of what we would now call a “Universal Basic Income,” where he pointed out that the “guarantee of an income independent of a job will be emancipatory or repressive, from the Left or the Right, according to whether it opens up new spaces for individual and social activity or whether, on the contrary, it is only the social wage for compulsory passivity [i.e. a form of extended unemployment or welfare benefit].”

Indeed, the only article in the book that could be said to have directly proposed a future in specifically utopian or destination terms not only never mentioned degrowth, but never made reference to Gorz. This would be Boris Zala’s “Humanoecopolis (An Alternative to Neoliberal Globalization),” in which Zala (a former member of the Slovak and European Parliaments in addition to having been an academic philosopher) states that “today, and even more in the future, we need a new universalism” [31] and thus proposes using a generalized universalism as the basis of the organization of a supra-state, a planetary power that takes the form of a “humanoecopolis”:

“‘Humano’ because the source of the of this power is humanity. ‘Eco’ because its intrinsic part and existential condition is the maintenance of the planet as a whole. And ‘polis’ because the subject of this power becomes the free citizen.”

Nonetheless, though Zala’s call for a “planetary rationality” to underlie the new universalism could be said to be broadly related to the Gorzian emphasis on the need for a new rationality, this is about as far as any such connection to Gorz can be articulated as Gorz never addressed (so far as I know) such “world government” scenarios.

All this means that, while the conference delineated and expanded on Parrique’s first and second types of degrowth in a Gorzian context quite nicely, and that, for example, Novosád’s discussion of Gorz and rationality, Jařab’s situating of Gorz in relation to modernity, and Buraj’s reminding us of the concept of “the good life” did set the stage for the third type, the conference never really made it to the substance of that type.

Or, to put it another way, while the conference, titled “Ecology, Politics and Freedom,” quite nicely covered “Ecology” and “Politics,” it never managed to do more than lay the groundwork for addressing the question of “Freedom” in Gorz’s thought.

And it is this last theme, this “freedom” in the politically visionary sense that Gorz meant it, that I would modestly propose to be a worthy topic for a future Gorz conference.

Greg Evans is a writer and translator who divides his time between the United States and the Czech Republic. He has written for numerous Czech publications and some American, including Green Social Thought, for which he was formerly a member of its editorial board.